As-salamu alaykum - Iraq’s elections and Muqtada al-Sadr’s bid for power
As-salamu alaykum. Muqtada al-Sadr’s recent move to skip the November vote looks less like giving up and more like a strategic pause as he tries to shape Iraq’s future.
By Alfadhel Ahmad
Last month al-Sadr announced his movement would boycott the elections, saying he wants to “change the faces and save Iraq” - words that fit with the stance he took after pulling his bloc out of parliament in June 2022. He also accused his rivals, the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) - parties widely seen as close to Iran - of attacking his allies.
Al-Sadr called for sweeping reform, but he’d reportedly tried private back-channel talks to get his group back into the election before ultimately failing. So this withdrawal reads more like a tactical delay than abandoning politics: he’s waiting for a chance to form a government on his terms.
Insiders say he’s playing a long game, betting that the state may falter under his rivals’ rule, while he keeps the Sadrists ready as a disciplined, independent option. A source close to al-Sadr, speaking anonymously, said some inside his movement pushed to run to protect Sadrist officials under pressure in state institutions. Al-Sadr initially agreed to let them try, but they missed the official registration deadline and needed an extension. He opened channels with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to ask for more time, but the SCF refused, not wanting Sadrist competition.
Talks dragged on until al-Sadr cut them off in July with a handwritten message and the boycott label.
A bit of background: al-Sadr withdrew in 2022 after his idea of forming a “national majority” government - where one coalition holds an outright majority and others become opposition - was blocked by Iraq’s long-standing power-sharing system, Muhasasa. Muhasasa distributes posts by sect and party and supporters say it prevents dictatorship, while critics blame it for weak accountability and bad governance.
Before the October 2021 election the Sadrists had been quietly building a cross-sectarian alliance, even opening talks with Sunni leader Mohammed al-Halbousi and visiting the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil. Their plan was to let each party manage its own areas while forming a government together and leaving others to be opposition. The alliance - including the Sadrists, KDP, and some Sunni groups - won a parliamentary majority on paper but the Federal Supreme Court’s interpretation raised the bar for forming a government, giving the SCF room to block them.
The Sadrists have been part of Iraq’s political scene since 2006 under different names and saw their influence peak with 73 seats in 2021. After they left parliament in 2022, many of those seats went to rivals. The SCF then put forward al-Sudani as prime minister and consolidated power, removing several Sadrist-aligned officials and, critics say, using state institutions against Sadr’s allies.
Al-Sadr turned to protests and street power, demanding parliament be dissolved and new elections. Supporters breached checkpoints into Baghdad’s Green Zone and staged a sit-in at parliament. The protest later escalated toward headquarters linked to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), and clashes followed until al-Sadr ordered his followers to stand down on live TV to avoid bloodshed.
The SCF-aligned parliament elected a new president and approved al-Sudani’s cabinet. Meanwhile, the state faces big problems: a heavy domestic spending load that eats up nearly all oil revenue, mounting external pressure from Israeli threats and accusations about militias on Iraqi soil, and US sanctions on banks and individuals accused of supporting Iran.
Al-Sadr has tried to strengthen his standing among Iraqi Shia, leaning on his respected family background and rebranding his movement as the Patriotic Shia Current in April 2024. He’s campaigned on issues that put pressure on the SCF within their shared religious base and even set up tents with food for pilgrims during Ashura in Tahrir and Haboubi squares - a bold move given the sensitivity of those protest sites.
Regionally, he’s kept distance from hardline rhetoric, signaling support for regime change in Syria while limiting his public response to the Gaza war to condemnations and statements. That posture seems aimed at presenting him as a more predictable partner for regional and Western actors.
If Iraq’s economy, security, or international standing worsens - because of sanctions, attacks, or internal collapse - al-Sadr and his Patriotic Shia Current might be positioned to fill any vacuum. Insha’Allah, whatever happens, Iraqis get stability and justice rather than more division.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news